

Topologies of Race: Doing territory, population and identity in Europe

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Abstract

Territorial borders just like other boundaries are involved in a politics of belonging, a politics of “us” and “them”. Border management regimes are thus part of processes of othering. In this article, we use the management of borders and populations in Europe as an empirical example to make a theoretical claim about race. We introduce the notion of the phenotypic other to argue that race is a topological object, an object that is spatially and temporally folded in distributed technologies of governance. To elaborate on these notions, we first examine a number of border management technologies through which both race and Europe are brought into being. More specifically we focus on how various such technologies aimed at monitoring the movement of individuals together with the management of populations have come to play crucial roles in Europe. Different border management regimes, we argue, do not only enact different versions of

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Europe but also different phenotypic others. We then shift the focus from border regimes to internal practices of governance, examining forensic DNA databanks to unravel articulations of race in the traffic between databases and societies.

Keywords

race, border management regimes, databases, phenotypic other

Introduction

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ways in which developments in the life sciences—spanning biomedicine, population genetics, ancestry testing, and criminal justice—have reinvigorated the biopolitics of race and racism (see collections edited by Koenig, Lee and Richardson 2008; Schramm, Skinner and Rottenburg 2012; and Whitmarsh and Jones 2010). Analysis of these developments has focused primarily on what has been termed “the molecularization of race” (Fullwiley 2007) or the genetic “reinscription of race” (El-Haj 2007). However, this article argues that to understand contemporary race and racism fully, developments in genomics should be located in a wider account of the changing dynamics of technology, population, and identity. In particular, it highlights the inseparability of the corporal and the digital in contemporary projects to know and govern bodies. This leads us away from the laboratory to a focus on systems of data collection, storage and management, arguing that racialization (in both senses of classification and discrimination) takes place through the production and use of data.

Notions of difference between and within populations are materially as well as epistemologically entwined with the technologies that are employed to know them (M'charek 2005). This article uses the example of Europe to highlight how at national and supranational levels, notions of formal citizenship, and other forms of political subjectivity are expressed through sociotechnical systems of government. In particular, systems for managing borders and populations often re/produce racialized differences and inequalities. These systems are positioned at the conjuncture between the physical and the virtual; they are at once legal and bureaucratic and also increasingly genetic and biometric.

Europe is best understood as a “technological zone” with shifting spaces of government (Barry 2001). In this zone, border regimes operate not just at its boundaries but “extend the governing of mobility into domains that

<i>Black list</i>			<i>White list</i>
Afghanistan	Haiti	Samoa	Andorra
Albania	India	São Tomé and Príncipe	Antigua and Barbuda
Algeria	Indonesia	Saudi Arabia	Argentina
Angola	Iran	Senegal	Australia
Armenia	Iraq	Sierra Leone	Bahamy
Azerbaijan	Jamaica	Solomon Islands	Barbados
Bahrain	Jordan	Sonulia	Brazil
Bangladesh	Kazakhstan	South Africa	Brunei Darussalam
Belarus	Kenya	Sri Lanka	Canada
Belize	Kiribati	Sudan	Chile
Benin	Kuwait	Surinam	Costa Rica
Bhutan	Kyrgyzstan	Swaziland	Croatia
Bolivia	Laos	Syria	Cuaternala
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Lebanon	Tajikistan	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Botswana	Lesotho	Tanzania	Holy See
Burkina Faso	Liberia	Thailand	Honduras
Burma/Myanmar	Libya	The Comoros	Israel
Burundi	Madagascar	Timor-Leste	Japan
Cambodia	Malawi	Togo	Malaysia
Cameroon	Maldives	Tonga	Mauritius
Cape Verde	Mali	Trinidad and Tobago	Mexico
Central African Republic	Marshall Islands	Tunisia	Monaco
Chad	Mauritania	Turkey	Montenegro
China	Micronesia	Turkmenistan	New Zealand
Colombia	Moldova	Tuvalu	Nicaragua
Congo	Mongolia	Uganda	Panama
Côte d'Ivoire	Morocco	Ukraine	Paraguay
Cuba	Mozambique	United Arab Emirates	Salvador
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Namibia	Uzbekistan	San Marino
Djibouti	Nauru	Vanuatu	Serbia
Dominica	Nepal	Vietnam	Seychelles Singapore
Dominican Republic	Niger	Yemen	South Korea
Ecuador	Nigeria	Zambia	Svatý Kryštof a Nevis
Egypt	North Korea	Zimbabwe	United States of America
Equatorial Guinea	Northen Marianas	Palestinian Authority	Uruguay
Eritrea	Oman	Taiwan	Venezuela
Ethiopia	Pakistan	British overseas territories citizens who do not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom	Hong Kong SAR
Fiji	Palau	British overseas citizens	Macao SAR
Gabon	Papua New Guinea	British subjects who do not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom	British nationals (overseas)
Gambia	Peru		
Georgia	Philippines		
Ghana	Qatar		
Grenada	Russia		
Guinea	Rwanda		
Guinea-Bissau	Saint Lucia		
Guyana	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		

Figure 1. List of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the European Union and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.³

regulate multiple aspects of daily life” (Amoore 2006, 338). These regimes produce different subjects whose movements are to be monitored, facilitated, restricted, or inhibited. They are organized around notions of personal identification, national identity, and otherness. Similarly, as we will show later in the article, Europe’s internal populations are increasingly known

through genetic–genealogical, medical, and forensic databases that in their varied regimes of sampling and classification also enact difference and belonging. Our discussion of the management of Europe's borders and populations allows us to make two theoretical moves. First, we use the notion of topology to attend to the distributed nature of race. In the European context, race is shadowy and seldom openly expressed in language. We examine technologies that seem indifferent to racial differences and show how in specific practices they contribute to the enactment of race. It is so-called visible minorities who often bear the brunt of the punitive regimes outlined in this article. Hence, our second theoretical move is to introduce the concept of the phenotypic other to make sense of this heightened visibility. The phenotypic other is not grounded in fixed or biological differences between bodies out there. Phenotypes or physical appearances go beyond the somatic body and include markers such as hairdo, dress, or beard style. Thus, differences ascribed to specific bodies that are deemed to belong to targeted groups are made visible and readable in specific sociopolitical contexts through specific scientific and technological practices. For this reason, the concept enables us to show that racial ascriptions do not neatly fit onto groups and individuals but instead rely, discursively and operationally, on complex configurations of the legal, scientific, and cultural.

Toward a Topological Understanding of Race and Racialization

Questions of race are central to many of the most contentious and high-profile issues in current European politics—notably migration, terrorism and security, crime, health, and welfare, as well as to “social cohesion” in general. Moreover, questions of belonging and identity are not only raised and answered in political meetings or on the pages of a newspaper, but they are also expressed in national and supranational sociotechnical systems of surveillance and identification. These systems contribute to the production of specific population categories that are considered to stand outside the normative order of citizenship, such as “problematic citizens,” “ethnic minorities,” or “illegal immigrants.” These categories, we argue, have racializing and racist effects.

Yet in many European settings, the centrality of race to contemporary modes of governance is officially denied (cf. Goldberg 2009). Race, to borrow a term from John Law, becomes an absent-presence (Law 2004). It may temporarily appear in plain sight in a particular practice only to then disappear again beneath the surface. This quality of race might be due to it

being coded in euphemism or to the changing nature of categories of classification. For example, the classification Moroccan at a university registry could be an administrative category indicating a person from Moroccan descent. Once linked to crime statistics this classification, say in the Dutch context, might become a racial category suggesting the tendency of Moroccans to commit crime (see e.g., M'charek 2008). Thus, in order to study race as an absent-presence, it is not feasible to simply follow the explicit use of the race concept. In order to understand the racializing logics implicit in many technologies of governance, rather than zooming in on race, we must “hover around it” (Latour 1987). Therefore, our article makes use of the concept of topology to highlight the complex temporal, spatial, and institutional dynamics of race-making at play in Europe (Serres and Latour 1995). More precisely, the topological approach allows us to appreciate four important aspects of the role of science and technology in these dynamics. First, it enables an understanding of race as a temporal and spatial relation that cannot be reduced to one singular entity (skin tone, DNA, religion, culture, nationality) or traced through a single, linear historical process. Second, and related to this, the topological approach, which is based on the presupposition that elements that are distant in time and space can become proximate and relevant in the here and now, helps us to understand how technologies that seem indifferent to racial differences contribute to the enactment of race. Third, it allows appreciation of the continual ambiguity, contestation and fluidity of notions of difference and belonging in contemporary Europe, and the specific ways in which race is done or undone. Finally, it takes us away from the familiar tropes for discussing border management and databases—as the panoptic gaze of the all-powerful state—to an appreciation of the ongoing technical, legal, and organizational challenges of bringing data about human difference to life.

Identity, Territory, and Mobility

Let us begin our discussion at the border. If we think about European borders today, an obvious starting point would be the European Union (EU), a politicoeconomic and sociocultural entity that performs an inside and an outside. The process of integration toward a single unified market of finance, goods, and labor started out in 1993 with a group of twelve countries and since then, the EU has grown to encompass twenty-seven countries.¹ At the heart of the EU internal market is the ideal of free movement of people, goods, and capital. Yet, one is struck by the tension

between this celebration and facilitation of movement and the increasing attempts to restrict and monitor the mobility into and within the EU of people deemed problematic in one way or the other. Increasingly, regimes of mobility have become in Van Houtum and Pijper's (2007) memorable phrase "two-faced" so that while European national borders are becoming invisible for some, they are all too hard and visible for others, even if the latter might find strategies to transgress them.

Although officially colorblind, the governance of movement, residence, and citizenship in the EU is in effect racialized. In this it follows a well-established pattern in European national immigration controls. For example, from the 1950s to the 1990s, a succession of UK governments restricted black and South Asian immigration from former colonies while leaving the settlement rights of the descendants of white colonists largely unaffected, using legislation that never explicitly mentioned race or ethnicity (Solomos 2003). This is, in the words of Tyler (2010), a regime of citizenship "designed to fail" particular minority populations. We can find comparable group discrimination in the legal, moral, and social techniques and practices that govern movement and settlement into the EU. This is well illustrated by considering the nationalities of those who are generally required or not required to obtain a visa to enter Europe.² In 2001, the European Council compiled two lists (see figure 1): 138 countries were placed on what was commonly referred to as the "Black List" whose nationals required an EU visa and 39 countries on the "White List" who did not. Responding to concerns about the racist connotations of the original terminology, the EU changed the wording from Black/White list to Positive/Negative list without changing the list system (Van Houtum 2010).

The Council provided little justification for the allocation of countries to one list or the other. In the official document it stated that

... [t]he determination of those third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement, and those exempt from it, is governed by a considered, case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria relating *inter alia* to illegal immigration, public policy and security, and to the European Union's external relations with third countries, consideration also being given to the implications of regional coherence and reciprocity. (European Commission 2012, 2)

The way in which illegal immigration, public policy, and security issues are adjoined to account for inclusion in the Black List is telling. As Elspeth Guild has argued: "... mala fides persons who are profiled as a risk are the poor. These are the persons who will always menace the Member States' security" (Guild 2001, 18).

But the list seems to enact additional clusters of risky nationalities and individuals. Almost all of South America (except for Cuba, Peru, and Colombia) is placed on the White List. By contrast, African countries and almost all of the so-called Muslim countries (except for Malaysia) are on the Black List. In addition to this, the list enacts the divisions of the Cold War. Except for countries that used to be part of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina is the exception here) all former Communist countries are on the Black List.⁴ As the list suggests, Europe's risky others come in many versions. But it is striking how often the two list systems will have the effect of distinguishing between white and nonwhite entrants to the EU.

The Black and White List of visa requirements is one of the numerous mechanisms that monitor, enable, and restrict people's mobility into and within Europe. These mechanisms act in particular on what are defined as problem groups—"illegal" migrants, nonresident guest workers, unwelcome settlers from former colonies, people from "Muslim countries" who are represented as "Islamists," and so on—that are often, although not exclusively, also phenotypically othered. Of course, on their own, lists do little: the management of mobility and security presents highly complex, large-scale technological and organizational challenges. These challenges are addressed through the translation of people into data that operate along specific notions of "suspect populations." To illustrate this point, we now describe five different sociotechnical border management systems.

1. The Schengen Information System (SIS)

The SIS is a database used by EU member states to hold and distribute information about individuals and goods in the context of national security, border control, and law enforcement.⁵ One of its major aims is managing "irregular movements," including the inflow of people coming from the outside of Europe. Schengen is quintessentially connected with reconciling the "free internal market" with major concerns of security (see Guild 2001; Broeders 2007). The central database (C-SIS) located in a bunker in Strasbourg contains information about the movement of suspect objects within the Schengen area (focusing e.g., on illicit trade in weapons, cars, and cigarettes). It also records visa holders entering the Schengen area and monitors their movement. In case of unlawful behavior of a visa holder, the system will send out an alert warning other authorities and instruct them about what to do when encountering that person. Moreover, it monitors whether or not a visa holder leaves the Schengen area within the prescribed time: overstaying a visa period already constitutes a crime in Switzerland and a similar law is being

prepared in the Netherlands. This reflects a broader trend—the combination and conflation of anxieties about migration, security, and crime: thus although the SIS system was erected to maintain “order and security” its core business has gradually turned into the surveillance of migrants (Guild 2001).

2. Frontex

Whereas the SIS is primarily concerned with monitoring the movement of “irregular migrants” within the European borders, the management of its external borders is delegated to an independent agent called FRONTEX (Frontières Extérieures), which was established in 2004. FRONTEX’s motto is “Liberty Security Justice” and its mission is to help member states to implement EU rules on external border controls. In its work of oversight FRONTEX is particularly occupied with the so-called Southern coastline (the Mediterranean Sea). For this task, its special forces called Rapid Border Intervention Teams are currently equipped with 20 airplanes, about 30 helicopters, and more than 100 vessels. FRONTEX had been criticized for operating a campaign of deterrence so broad that it blocked asylum seekers that use boat crossings from legitimately claiming protection.⁶ In its Annual Risk Analysis reports, FRONTEX publishes extensive data on irregular movements of people and things, and maps representing “the invasion” of the EU by irregular migrants (Van Houtum 2010). However, as Van Houtum (2010) has argued despite the detailed nature of these data and mapping, the 17,306 individuals who died between 1993 and 2012 in their attempt to enter Europe are made invisible through this process.

3. Eurodac

Eurodac is an automated fingerprint identification system that is primarily designed to record and compare the fingerprints of asylum seekers above the age of fourteen years and of “irregular immigrants.” This “machine-readable inscription of bodies with signs of illegality” (Van der Ploeg 1999) is intended to prevent asylum seekers from “shopping” for refugee status, that is, after being refused a residence permit in one country, moving on to the next to start a new procedure. The country of registration, which is the first country of entry into EU territory, is the country where the asylum seeker is obliged to seek acceptance. This system enforces the Dublin Regulation (enacted in 2003). It is used in all EU member states and also in Iceland and Norway.

4. Visa Information System (VIS)

The VIS is a system that is now being developed as part of the Second Phase of the Schengen treaty, SIS II. It is envisioned as a databank consisting of

personal information and biometric data (ten fingerprints and biometric photograph) of third-country nationals who apply for a visa to enter the Schengen area. While the storing of biometric data to identify “over-stayers” is on top of the list, an associated goal of VIS is to achieve interoperability between all the afore-mentioned systems to make possible the exchange and trawling of data across different European countries. Also, and this is a second goal, it is to allow new organizations (such as Europol) to access the databanks. The argument is “availability of data”: the effort between member states is to make their data, once compiled, available to other member states in order to reduce costs and efforts.

Even more so, this high-tech database will be accessed and checked not only from within Europe (however defined) but also in third countries at the consulates, in cases where individuals file for a visa. Given the list of about 138 countries whose citizens are subject to the visa regime (the so-called Black List), one could say that the borders of Europe reach out into at least so many countries in the world and on different continents. The globe has thus become the playing field of the EU border management regime.

5. Prüm Decision

The Prüm Decision⁸ (also known as Schengen III) aims at sharing data pertaining to DNA profiles, fingerprints, and motor vehicle information stored in databanks of different European countries. The aim of the system is “to combat terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration”⁹ within Europe. The treaty has now been signed by twelve member states: Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, and Romania.

However, just as with VIS, the Prüm Decision contains provisions for operation outside the European territory. Along with provisions for armed sky marshals on flights between signatory states, it also has the capacity for (armed) police forces to enter the territory of another state for the “prevention of immediate danger.” Hence, the boundaries of Europe are fluid depending on where the “immediate danger” is deemed to be.

This list of social and technical border management systems suggests some of the ways in which the EU is gradually “transforming into a digital and selective border machine” (Van Houtum 2010, 692). Our discussion of these systems is inevitably brief and schematic, but it does allow us to make three points. First, although we speak conveniently of Europe, it is not one singular thing, but consists of different configurations depending on the specific technologies in place and the matters of concern involved. So, for example, not all EU

members have enrolled in the Prüm Decision, while non-EU nations such as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland participate in initiatives such as the Eurodac system. Similarly, these systems have a reach that extends beyond the geographical boundaries of Europe: databases are accessed and biometric information is collected in the embassies and consulates of European countries around the world—not least in the 138 Visa Black List countries.

Second, these different versions of Europe and who belongs in it are enacted through sociotechnical assemblages that encompass treaties and conventions, transport and military hardware, fingerprints, biometric photographs, and DNA samples and in which databases play a pivotal role. Experiments continue with iris scans, retina scans, hand geometry, face recognition, signature recognition, keystroke patterning, carbon dating, and X-rays to expand further the repertoire of identification technology (Beynon-Davies 2007). Thus, in the words of Amoore (2006, 336), bodies and their data doubles “become sites of multiple encoded borders.”

Third, the “border machine” simultaneously *constitutes* and *discriminates against* racialized groups of people, even if the explicit language of race and ethnicity is largely absent from its official remit. In this there is a complex but persistent coming together of two processes: on one hand, a preoccupation with the measurement of embodied differences and on the other, a practical focus on “visibly different” minorities. This dual process produces what we call the *phenotypic other*, who is clustered on the basis of physical as well as cultural markers. Furthermore, in the context of the current European border management regime, this phenotypic other is constituted in conjunction with concerns about security and crime.

Criminalization is not merely expressed through a rhetoric of suspicion, it is also enacted in the very border management regimes. The central database of the SIS contains information about the name, sex, country of origin, aliases, “distinctive physical features,” and information about being armed or not of immigrants who travel in(to) the Schengen area. The “operational core” of this system (SIRENE [Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry]) is especially aimed at the exchange of information for *criminal intelligence* purposes (Broeders 2007, 78). And SIRENE does not stand alone. Thus, for example, Eurodac, which contains the fingerprints of persons seeking an asylum status, was consulted in the Netherlands in criminal investigations (looking for hits). Upon this the European Committee has suggested to regulate such usage on a European level. Equally, as indicated earlier, the Prüm Decision links criminal investigation with the

protection of the European border against illegal immigrants and terrorism. Although the rationale for these systems might well be pragmatic, they have a racializing effect: immigrants as a group are turned into potential criminals.

Policing Populations Within

As the last section showed, “the border” neither begins nor ends at the geographical boundaries of Europe. The ongoing development of border regimes aimed at facilitating and controlling mobilities across European borders are increasingly connected to the management of populations *within* Europe.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the German police collected and searched personal data from more than eight million people in order to identify potential Islamic terrorists living in Germany. To do this, they trawled three separate databases: databases of registration offices (*Einwohnermeldeämter*), which hold information about all residents; those of universities/polytechnics, which account for a special class of people, that is, educated students; and the German database on foreigners, the Central Foreigners Register (*Ausländerzentralregister*), which controls the legal status of migrants in Germany (Kant 2005). Based on the backgrounds of members of the “Hamburg cell” who carried out the 9/11 attack, police profiled potential terrorists as:

- Eighteen to forty years;
- Male;
- Current or former student;
- Resident in the regional state (Land) the data are collected in;
- Muslim;
- Legally resident in Germany;
- Nationality or country of birth from a list of twenty-six states with predominantly Muslim population; or stateless person; or nationality “undefined” or “unknown.”¹⁰

So this is the face of terrorism. But, as Elspeth Guild has argued, it is simultaneously performed as “the face of the immigrant” (Guild 2003, 336), the entity that the border regimes discussed above are aimed at. It is interesting to note that one of the criteria is “legal residency”—a status that is viewed with suspicion since even those who are already inside Europe may turn out to mark a potential threat. The profile of a phenotypic other therefore does not only pertain to the one outside, the one who is

trying to enter the Schengen territory, but it serves to unmask the “sleeper” (*Schläfer*, home grown terrorist)—it is projected onto the stranger within.

As we saw in the previous section, border management systems thus shift their attention back and forth between monitoring migration, the identification of potential terrorists, and the prevention of crime (see also Broeders 2007; Guild, Carrera, and Geyer 2008).

A second example of how technologies both constitute and discriminate against racialized others is DNA databanking. Large forensic databases storing, counting, measuring, monitoring, and identifying individuals and populations based on biological characteristics are a significant feature of the contemporary scene. The scale of these undertakings (and the financial and institutional investment they require) is great so that in the most extreme case, the UK forensic database contains records for approximately 10 percent of the entire national population (National Policing Improvement Agency 2012). The expansion of these databases has been driven by faith in what Williams (2010) terms “the forensic imaginary”—a belief in a future in which genetic science fundamentally alters the efficiency of criminal justice. In the context of forensic DNA, the logic of identification has been extended by a logic of investigation. By this we mean that the DNA profile is now not only used to *identify* a known suspect but also to *generate* an unknown suspect through, for example, “cold” searching (M'charek 2008; M'charek, Toom, and Prainsack 2012). Central to the concept of a mass forensic database is the collection and ongoing surveillance of large numbers of DNA profiles of people who may in the future commit crime. However, no database has pretensions to universal coverage, all current examples are constructed (in varied forms) via purposive sampling of suspect populations (Williams and Johnson 2008; Machado and Silva 2009).

Moreover, population is not one single concept, but can take various shapes (M'charek 2000; Hinterberger 2012). Neither the imagined population that a forensic database seeks to know or to make secure nor the records that make up that database can be seen as neutral or arbitrary constructions. Thus, while no database is officially deemed to be operating along racial criteria, they are in effect racialized in their composition (as often the suspect and the phenotypic other align) and, in some cases, their management and use.

An exceptional but telling case in Europe is the UK Police National DNA Database (NDNAD). The NDNAD is racialized in a number of different ways. This can be seen first in the disproportionate numbers of people from visible minorities represented on the database: some estimates suggest

that upward of 70 percent of all “black” men in the United Kingdom aged between eighteen and thirty-five have profiles stored on the database (Randerson 2006; Black Mental Health 2012). The DNA profiles in the NDNAD are routinely classified by “ethnic appearance,” which enables the monitoring of this disproportionate representation of nonwhite “ethnic minorities.” This classification also, however, facilitates research aimed at developing techniques to “ethnically profile” unknown suspects using crime scene DNA. This double-edged role of categorization underlines the slipperiness of race in these processes. For the British case might seem a blatant example of the coming together of sociotechnology and institutional racism. Yet, the collection of “ethnic monitoring data” and its repeated discussion in Parliamentary Committees and within the systems of ethical governance of the NDNAD has itself been used to argue that no racial bias exists in the system (Skinner 2012; Skinner 2013).

The NDNAD is categorized using seven “ethnic appearance” labels: Afro-Caribbean, Arab, Asian, dark-skinned European, Oriental, white-skinned European, and Other.¹¹ Each person whose DNA is taken by the police is allocated to one of these categories. This classification is not based on the information in the DNA or the science of genetics, which may well contradict these categories. Neither is it based on the self-identification of the person stopped by the police, but rather on the classification of so-called visible characteristics by the examining police officer. The rationale being that this mode of classification comes closest to the racial identity a potential eyewitness would ascribe to this person. In other words, more or less fluid social notions of phenotypical differences, with Posel (2001) we could say, “race as common sense,” are mobilized and built into the architecture of the NDNAD. In the creation of phenotypic others, physical features, clothing, class, language, habitus, and so on, are thus conjoined, and often arbitrarily so.

As the NDNAD case shows, racialization is a process heavily influenced by national policy and politics as well as the pragmatics of police work.¹² The reconfiguration of race and ethnicity through genomics and other technoscientific and bureaucratic regimes may have global currency, but at the same time there are important and varied national and regional articulations. The UK classificatory practice revolves around a system of “ethnic categorization” and a set of bureaucratic processes of “ethnic monitoring” that would receive little support in many other European countries. But given the weight of evidence of the overpolicing of significant portions of Europe’s “minority” populations—citizens from former colonies, descendants of migrants, Sinti and Roma, and so on—it is reasonable to

assume that the underlying logic of the racialization (and criminalization) of phenotypic others is reflected in the composition and usage of other national forensic databases.

This directs our attention to a wider discussion of a morality of “good” biological citizenship and the ways that morality has a racial inflection. Notions of mutual future benefit and of deserving and undeserving citizens are at the heart of these systems of surveillance and identification. Forensic DNA databases are the object of ongoing debates about their scope and purpose: how to create, store, exchange, and eventually (not) destroy the DNA records (see Hindmarsh and Prainsack 2010). Discussions relate to the management of and access to samples and data. Recurring themes of controversy are first whether the records of those not convicted of a crime should be stored, and second whether the continuing growth of databases needs to be monitored so as to avoid a “function creep,” the ever wider and unintended uses of technologies.

Appreciation of these debates is crucial for our understanding of technologies of belonging in relation to citizenship and legal status. On one hand, they mirror the profiling practices at the European borders and the constructions of phenotypic others at which they are aimed, thus reminding us that processes of racialization are not restricted to border situations. On the other hand, however, the fact that there *is* a debate about privacy issues and the protection of citizens' rights contrasts with the border management regimes discussed earlier, where there is little public controversy about the mass storage of data, the rights of potential immigrants are not foregrounded, and many of the people who are objects of the system remain in an abject state of exemption (Tyler 2013). So there is an important distinction between formal citizenship and other, more insecure, legal statuses—and yet this citizenship is not the same for everybody.

There is a final lesson to be drawn from the example of forensic databases. There are differences between legal frameworks, systems of governance and, indeed, between policing and laboratory practice around DNA across the various national databases in Europe. These might appear as insurmountable obstacles to cooperation and networking between European databases. Yet, as we have shown, this collaboration across national borders has become top priority and with the implementation of the Prüm Decision it has also become a regular practice between the signatory countries. Forensic DNA databases are run according to different regulations and laws as to how, when and why a citizen's or resident's genetic material can be taken and used; yet this does not prevent the sharing of genetic intelligence between European police forces and forensic scientists. As Machado and Silva (2009) and Hindmarsh

and Prainsack (2010) argue there is a “logic of convergence” that assumes all national databases will inevitably grow in scope in the future, constituting an ever-widening population of genetic suspects.

However, while the notion of a logic of convergence is compelling, we should beware conflating this with a seamless account of systems. Databases are always “out of control,” “in development,” and “being re-negotiated.”

One might speculate that the differing ways that race is articulated across Europe might in fact work against the logic of convergence between databases and their associated legal and ethical infrastructures or else that the linking of these systems will smooth out the obvious disjunctions. And yet race is elusive but resilient—an absent-presence. At points, it is in plain sight but despite explicit race talk any implication of racism is vehemently denied; at other points, it is hidden from view but for all insistence on formal equality it becomes all too manifest in the unequal consequences of surveillance through Europe’s technobureaucratic systems.

Conclusion

This article is an intervention designed to provoke further discussion about the changing politics of race, science, and technology. An exploration of the complex temporal, spatial, and institutional dynamics of race making in Europe leads beyond the analysis of the genetic reinscription of race that has dominated recent science and technology studies-informed work. Thinking about Europe as a technological zone, we have argued instead for a topological account of race and space. This approach together with the notion of the phenotypic other has enabled us to demonstrate the racializing effects of European regimes of border management and of the governance of populations through DNA databases.

In conclusion, and to hammer home our point about race as a topological object, let us revisit our example of ethnic profiling and our observation of how race was enacted as the Muslim identity through the “face of terrorism.” The Muslim identity that was at stake here was not necessarily residing in a person’s body. Rather, it was enacted as a *relation* among a terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, in New York, a policing tactic in Germany in a post-9/11 era, the presence of a student of Arabic descent in Hamburg prior to 9/11, the *Rasterfahndung* (dragnet) developed in the 1970s as a method to contain Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) terrorism in Germany, a shifting political debate about European self-definition as Judeo-Christian and the limits of multiculturalism, plus a legal political agreement between several countries in Europe to put the fight against terrorism high on the

political agenda and to mobilize monetary and technical resources to achieve that. It is through this network of distributed technologies of governance and the multiple relations in space and time which they evoke that Muslim identity is recreated as a phenotypic other and thereby racialized. The topological approach that we suggest here thus helps to relieve the body from the burden of racial markers and places it in a network of practices so as to understand how it is actually performed as different.

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Notes

1. These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2. Defined in this case as the Schengen area.
3. Compiled from Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, March 15, 2001. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2001R0539:20070119:EN:PDF> (Download 07/10/2013)
4. This is connected to the different concerns of the member states. For example, Germany and Austria were very keen to put the former socialist countries on the list because of alleged criminal activities that the absence of eastern borders generated.
5. Not all Schengen countries are EU member states; three non-EU members are part of Schengen. And not all EU member states, notably United Kingdom and Ireland, are part of Schengen. The current Schengen countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In addition, Schengen countries can ask for temporary exemptions to opt out. France's request for the permission to close the border it shares with Italy as to obstruct the stream of immigrants from Tunisia after the revolution of December 2010 provides a case in point.
6. See, for example, "NGO Statement on International Protection: The High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges to UNHCR's March 2008

Standing Committee Meeting [Word]—March 2008,” at <http://www.icva.ch/search.html?searchmax=10&searchstring=FRONTEX&x=0&y=0> (accessed November 1, 2012). For important analyses of FRONTEX, its focus on the southern borders of the EU as well as the intricate politics and concerns of the member states, see Wolff (2008); Klepp (2011).

7. What was previously known as the Prüm Convention is now referred to as the Prüm Decision, as it was adopted into EU law.
8. Council of Europe, Prüm Convention, July 7, 2005, 1. The Prüm Treaty and the way it was enacted including the lack of democratic deliberation has solicited considerable critique; see, for example, Walsch (2008); Prainsack and Toom (2010).
9. See, Open Society Justice Initiative 2007, 8; Kant 2005, 19. In practice, the German endeavor was a failure, as most databases do not even contain the category Muslim, only Catholic, Protestant, and Other. So Muslim had to be replaced by other (see Kant 2005).
10. These categories are at odds with conventions of ethnic classification utilized in other areas of UK policy making (see Skinner 2012).
11. The Netherlands provides a contrasting example of how race is deemed relevant in forensic DNA practice. While profiles on the Dutch database are not classified according to ethnic categories the Netherlands has introduced the category of biological race in the Dutch criminal code as a relevant for the DNA-based inference of externally visible characteristics of an unknown suspect. This use of forensic DNA is not directly aimed at the identification of the individual suspect but rather at producing a suspect population defined by a supposedly shared phenotype (M'charek 2008; M'charek, Toom, and Prainsack 2012).

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